Rate base valuation methods and firm efficiency / BEBR No.845 by Primeaux, Walter J. & Bubnys, Edward Leo

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
BOOKSTACKS
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/ratebasevaluatio845prim

FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 845
Rate Base Valuation Methods and Firm Efficiency
Edward Bubnys
Walter J. Primeaux, Jr.
College of Commerce and Business Administration
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
University of Illinois. Urbana-Champaign
,,.:.
BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 845
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
January 1982
Rate Base Valuation Methods and Firm Efficiency
Walter J. Primeaux, Jr., Professor
Department of Business Administration
Edward Bubnys
Illinois State University

Abstract
In an Important publication in 1962, Eiteman brought statistical
methods to bear in a study of the impact of public utility regulation
on fifteen Bell Telephone Companies. After Eiteman' s work, a number of
additional statistical studies examined the rate base question; however,
the focus of attention has been upon the effect of rate base methods on
consumer prices or rates of return earned by the utility. This research
is concerned with entirely different questions; the central question
examined is how do different rate base regulatory regimes affect resource
allocation and economic efficiency.
The paper uses a unique set of time series data for firms operating
in states where rate base methods have changed anytime since World War
II; consequently, firm effects are determined both before and after the
change in regulatory regimes. Also, a new statistical approach was
developed to assess the overall effect of changes in rate base methods.
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INTRODUCTION
This study uses a new data set and a unique statistical procedure
to evaluate the effects of different rate base methods on the economic
performance of regulated firms.
Previously published studies have only used cross section data to
assess the effect of rate base methods. However, regulation is imposed
on individual firms and not upon the industry as an entity. Therefore,
it seems that the relevant focus of attention of evaluative research
should be on the firm, through time, and not a cross section of firms
at a point in time. For that reason, the data of this study consists
of time series information for individual firms located in all states
where rate base methods have been changed sometime since World War II.
This procedure, together with the specially-devised econometric method,
makes it possible to examine the same individual firms operating under
the constraints of both fair value and original cost rate base valua-
tion.
PURPOSES OF THE STUDY
Several recent cases before the Illinois Supreme Court reflect
current interest and concern about rate base valuation in the public
utility rate determination process. The opinions of all parties
involved in those cases suggest that final operating results for a
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utility firm would depend upon whether original cost or fair value rate
base valuation is used in regulatory proceedings.
Some previous studies have attempted to assess the actual effects
of different rate base methods on firm rates of return and prices
charged to consumers. However, previous research has totally neglected
the effects of different rate base methods on resource allocation and
efficiency performance of firms subjected to different types of utility
regulation. Such an evaluation is the central purpose of this study;
the main objective is to determine whether different methods of rate
base determination affect resource allocation and efficiency of electric
utility firms. This is an important question because it is concerned
with whether or not different forms of regulation affect the efficiency
in which economic resources are used in the economy. The overall
results show that some firms do modify their process of resource allo-
cation, depending upon the regulatory regimes in which they operate;
however, the results are not at all uniform and there seems to be no
systematic relationship between changes in rate base method and their
effect on resource allocation decisions.
PREVIOUS STUDIES
Studies of the economic effect of different rate base valuation
methods emerged early in the history of electric utility regulation.
However, as mentioned earlier, the focus of the previous research has
been on prices paid by consumers and rates of return earned by utility
firms. So, the previous research is only of indirect interest to this
study.
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2
In an important seminal paper, Eiteman examined the impact of
public utility regulation on fifteen Bell Telephone Companies. He
found that original cost regulatory jurisdictions had permitted the
highest rates of return on rate bases and firms operating in reproduc-
tion cost jurisdictions had permitted the lowest. Hagerman and
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Ratchford reported similar results. Eiteman explained that the higher
permitted rates had been only partially compensatory because actual
rates of return to book value of securities have been highest for com-
panies in reproduction cost jurisdictions and lowest in the original
4
cost jurisdictions.
Pike found that mean rate of return was 6.38 percent on net plant
in original cost states and 6.3 percent where other valuation methods
were used. The spread between earnings under different valuation methods
had narrowed and was not statistically significant.
Primeaux found that the three most commonly used methods of rate
base determination resulted in firms earning approximately the same
rates of return. The results were the same for both years (1967 and
1973) included in the sample.
Primeaux, Bubnys and Rasche used time series data to examine the
effect of differences in rate base methods in affecting real earnings,
real prices and consumer welfare. The results show no support for the
notion that firms generally fare better with respect to real realized
earnings or real price levels under fair value instead of original cost
rate base valuation.
While the above studies examine important aspects of rate base
valuation method, they do not examine matters of resource allocation
8
and efficiency effects on firm decision making.
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III. THE THEORY
The rate making equation is as follows:
Cost of service =RR=E+d+T+ (V-D)R (1)
where:
RR = revenue requirement of the firm
E current operating expenses (excluding depreciation)
d = current depreciation expenses
T = current taxes
V = gross value of physical property
D = accrued depreciation
R = rate of return
(V-D) = rate base
(V-D)R return amount
In the process of a rate case the firm is allowed to recover,
through future rates charged for its services, all of the current
operating expenses incurred, including current depreciation and taxes.
Moreover, as indicated in the above rate making equation, the firm is
also allowed to include in the rates charged for its services a compo-
nent to cover (V-D)R. That is, the value of the rate base multiplied
by a rate of return (this is the return amount).
Original cost jurisdictions value the (V-D) component in the equa-
tion at the value of the property when it was first installed in a
public utility application. Fair value attempts to adjust the value of
the (V-D) component to that level which more correctly reflects its
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current value and reproduction cost attempts to adjust the value of the
property to that level which would permit reproduction of the property.
The established rate base value (V-D), would generally be larger in
fair value jurisdictions than in original cost states. Consequently,
there would seem to be a greater incentive for a firm to require exces-
sive capital stock in a fair value regime than in an original cost
regime. This is especially true since the procedure involves an element
of cost plus pricing which allows a utility firm to earn a larger account-
ing profit if its plant investment is larger. This tendency would cause
two primary effects on the firms economic performance. First, it would
cause available plant capacity to increase because a firm would tend to
add larger amounts of capacity than it needs to satisfy consumer demand
if it operates in a fair value regime instead of an original cost regime.
Second, the level of capacity utilization would be expected to decline
if a firm operates in a fair value regime because the excess capacity
it installs would not be needed to satisfy consumer demand and would
not be used.
PROCEDURE
As mentioned earlier, the sample consists of firms located in those
states which changed the method of rate base determination anytime
during the period 1948-1978.
The sample makes it possible to determine the reaction of the indi-
vidual firms as they attempted to adjust to changes in rate base methods;
in other words, as they made decisions under changing regulatory con-
straints. Instead of using cross section data, as was done in previous
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studies, the decision was made to examine the effect of changes in rate
base valuation methods on individual firms; therefore, the data consists
of time series observations for a selected sample of firms which are
unique.
Extreme care was taken to properly classify the firms included in
the sample. This was deemed necessary due to inconsistencies in rate
base valuation classifications found in various sources. The published
rates base method for each state was validated by referring to six dif-
ferent sources to assure that the correct rate base method was used
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here. The data were examined through time to ascertain which states
had ever changed method during the period since WWII.
In some cases, there was ambiguity even after reviewing the above-
mentioned references and state regulatory commissions were contacted to
resolve remaining questions.
Overall, this review revealed that only four states had unam-
biguously changed during the 1948-1978 time interval. Alabama changed
from fair value to original cost in 1971; Illinois changed from fair
value to original cost in 1973; North Carolina changed from original
cost to fair value in 1964 and Missouri changed from original cost to
fair value In 1958. The fact that two states changes ££ original cost
and two changed from original cost during the sample period tends to
enhance the value of the data.
All possible privately owned firms from each of the four states
changing rate base method during the 1948-1978 period were included in
the sample. Since publicly owned firms are largely free of state regu-
lation, and are sometimes given different regulatory treatment than
-7-
privately owned firms, they were excluded from the sample. The final
sample consisted of one firm from Alabama, seven from Illinois, eight
from Missouri, and four from North Carolina.
Some firms were excluded from certain equations because they were
only generating companies and did not have residential sales and a few
firms were totally omitted because of insufficient data.
A separate set of equations was run for each firm in the sample;
ordinary least squares multiple regression analysis was the approach
used to develop the basic equations. Two different reduced form equa-
tions (for capacity utilization and capital intensity) were developed
for each firm to assess the effects of different rate base methods on
resource allocation and efficiency.
The econometric approach involved the following steps: first, the
data for all sample observations were included in the reduced form equa-
tions for each individual firm. Second, an equation was run for each
firm for each dependent variable, using only the long subsample of data.
For example, in the state of Illinois, the rate base method was fair
value for 1948-1972 and original cost from 1973 onwards. Consequently,
the long subsample, for firms in that state, would consist of the fair
value observations which occurred during the 1948-72 period. The long
subsample period differed from state to state, depending on when the
rate base valuation change took place. The residuals computed from
these regressions were used in subsequent steps in the analysis.
In the third step, the long subsample regression was extrapolated
(forward or backward, depending upon the situation) through the short
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subsample time period and the mean error was computed for the short
subsample. Fourth, the standard error of forecast was computed for
each short subsample time period based on estimates for the long sub-
sample. Fifth, under the assumption that the standard error of fore-
casts are independent across time, the standard error of the mean
forecast error was computed during the short subsample period. Finally,
the ratio of the mean error for the short subsample to the standard
error of the mean forecast error was used to compute a t ratio for the
mean forecast error of the short subsample. Each of the above six
steps was followed for each dependent variable, for each firm in the
sample.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The reduced form equation for the rate base effects on firm
resource allocation and efficiency is as follows:
LY = B, + B„LGNP + B-LVA + B.LPOP + B CLPE + B,LC + B7T12 3 4 o /
+ BgLGP + B_IT + U
where: LY = natural log of dependent variable, explained below
LGNP natural log of real GNP, in billions of dollars
LVA - natural log of real value added by manufacturing,
in billions of dollars
LPOP = natural log of state population, in thousands of persons
LPE natural log of real production expenses, in dollars
LC natural log number of ultimate consumers, by number of
consuming units
T = a time trend, a linear index where 1948 0, 1949 =1, ...
1978 =• 30
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LGP = natural log real natural gas price, state averages, in
thousands of dollars per trillion BTUs
IT = a profitability trend for the industry (net income of all
electric utilities in the U.S., divided by operating
revenue of all electric utility firms in the U.S.)
U = a random disturbance term.
The data and its sources are discussed in the appendix. The proce-
dure involved in this study generated a large number of regressions and
variables. Only partial information is presented in the tables.
CAPITAL INTENSITY
As mentioned previously, a public utility firm may tend to use more
capital in its rate base if the fair value method is used because the
firm would be expected to earn a larger return with that type of valua-
tion. To the extent that this does occur and to the extent that capital
stock becomes excessive, the results constitute a misallocation of eco-
nomic resources.
Table 1 presents some statistics extracted from the individual firm
equations with log of real capital intensity as the dependent variable.
As mentioned earlier, throughout the analysis, the size of the long
subsamples used to develop the firm equations in each state depended
upon the year in which the rate base method was changed.
The t statistics indicate whether the change in rate base method
actually affected capital intensity. Table 1 shows that three of seven
Illinois firms reduced capital intensity when the valuation method
changed from fair value to original cost; three firms increased capital
intensity, while one firm did not change as the regulatory regime
changed. The three reductions are consistent with the theory while the
other four results are inconsistent.
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TABLE 1
LOG OF REAL CAPITAL INTENSITY
(Log Undepreciated Electric Utility Plant, Real Terms )
KWM Sales to Ultimate Consumers (In 000 kwh)
FIRM NAME MEAN ERROR STD. DEV. t VALUE
ILLINOIS I
(Fair value. 1948-72;
original cost, 1973-78)
Central 111.
1.83bLight .230 .125
Central 111.
2.09bPublic Service .138 .066
Commonwealth
2.30bEdison .144 .062
Illinois Power -.091 .061 -1.50C
Mount Carmel -.004 .068 -.058
Sherrard Power
System -.187 .031 -6.04*
-2.35bSouth Beloit -.117 .050
ALABAMA:
(Fair value, 1948-70;
original cost, 1971-78)
Alabama Power .226 .023 10.01*
MISSOURI:
\ R_ D.W.
25 .67 1.13
25 .97 1.26
25 .96 1.40
25 .98 1.97
25 .98 2.68
25 .99 2.77
25 .99 1.78
23 .99 1.80
(Original coat, 1948-57;
fair value, 1958-78)
Empire District
Electric -.605
Kansas City
Power & Light -.118
Missouri Edison -.190
Missouri Power
& Light -.0006
Missouri Public
Service -.949
Missouri
Utilities .201
St. Joseph Light
& Power -.306
Union Electric -.490
NORTH CAROLINA :
(Original cost, 1948-63;
fair value, 1964-78)
Carolina Power
5 Light .265 .023 11. 73* 16 .99 1.90
Duke Power .261 .051 5.08 16 .94 2.06
Nantahala Power
6 Light .065 .192 0.34 16 .79 2.89
Yadkin 1.357 1.111 1.22 16 .80 2.61
a
12 level,
b
5Z level,
C
10Z level
Source: Extracted from complete equations containing all variables In
the model.
.106 -6.00* 21 .96 1.15
.035 -3.39* 21 .99 2.42
.066 -2.89* 21 .99 1.23
.030 -o.oz 21 .99 1.97
.153 -6.22* 21 .97 1.62
.051 3.92* 21 .99 2.01
.082 -3.72* 21 .95 1.60
.102 -4.82* 21 .95 1.73
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The table also shows that the one Alabama firjn increased capital
intensity as the state changed from fair value to original cost rate
making. This change is inconsistent with theoretical expectations.
In the case of Missouri, backward extrapolation was used to compute
the mean error and standard deviation of the forecast because the short
subsample occurs before the change in regulatory regimes. Table 1 shows
that one firm used the same level of capital intensity under both types
of regulation and another had a higher level of capital intensity under
original cost than under fair value regulation; in contrast six firms
reflected the opposite result. The six firms employing a higher capital
intensity under fair value behaved consistent with theory while other
results are contrary to theoretical expectations.
Two firms in North Carolina experienced higher levels of capital
intensity after the change from original cost to fair value rate base
valuation and two did not change. The two experiencing higher levels
of capital intensity under fair value were consistent with theory.
All-in-all the results of changes of rate base valuation methods on
capital intensity seemed somewhat mixed. A summary of the state-by-
state results for the individual firms reveals that the change in capi-
tal intensity was in the direction expected from the theory in the case
of eleven firms, while the theory failed in nine instances. The results
are quite clear; there is no systematic pattern, as a whole, firms did
not seem to make additions to their capital stock to take advantage of
the more liberal form of regulation.
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CAPACITY UTILIZATION
If firms add generating capacity in excess of their requirements,
merely to gain from changes in rate base method valuation, excess capa-
city would be created. To the extent that excess capacity is created,
it constitutes a misallocation of economic resources. That issue is
examined in this section.
Table 2 presents selected information extracted from the individual
firm equations with log of capacity utilization as the dependent
variable. The same procedure as used in the previous section was used
to determine whether excess capacity was created as firms increased
their capital stock and take advantage of the more generous rate base
valuation method. One would expect that the increase in capital stock,
under these circumstances, would increase excess capacity because the
increase would not be necessary to satisfy consumer demand. Obviously,
increases in capital stock induced by a more intense consumer demand,
is not at issue here. These types of adjustments would be made
irrespective of the method of rate base determination; indeed, they are
rather independent of regulation. So, it is the additional excess capa-
city, created as firms adjust to the changing regulatory regimes, which
is of concern.
Table 2 shows extracts from complete equations when capacity utili-
zation was used as the dependent variable. Results for firms in the
state of Illionis show that two firms' capacity utilization increased
when regulation changed from fair value to original cost rate making.
This is consistent with theoretical expectations. At the same time,
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TABLE 2
LOG OF CAPITAL UTILIZATION
(Log Net Generation (In 000 lewh))
Prod. Plants x 8760
FIRM NAME MEAN ERROR STD. DEV. t VALUE \ •* D.W.
ILLINOIS:
(Fair value, 1948-72;
original cost, 1973-78)
Central 111.
-2„38bLight -.450 .189 25 .36 1.79
Central 111.
5.66
b
Public Service .920 .162 25 .74 2.48
Commonwealth c
Edison .130 .086 1.51 25 .86 1.80
Illinois Power -.150 .142 -1.05
-5.27a
25 .65 2.20
Mount Carael -1.163 .221 25 .72 2.06
South Beloit -.275 .229 -1.20 25 .38 1.65
ALABAMA:
(Fair value, 1948-70;
original cost, 1971-78)
Alabama Power - »062 .059 1.05 23 .88 2.15
MISSOURI:
(Original cost, 1948-57;
fair value, 1958-78)
Eaplre District a
Electric .307 .120 2.56
a
21 .64 1.42
Kansas City b
Power & Light .267 .151 l,77 21 .50 2.20
Missouri Power
-4.94*& Light -1.240 .251 21 .98 2.46
Missouri Public
2.68*Service 1.614 .602 21 .55 2.89
Missouri e
Utilities 1.671 1.101 1.52 21 .86 2.33
St. Joseph Light a
& Power 1.648 .167 9.86* 21 .86 1.82
Union Electric -.020 .220 -0.09 21 .71 2.13
NORTH CAROLINA:
(Original cost, 1948-63;
fair value, 1964-78)
Carolina Power
& Light .019 .084 0.22 16 .79 3.37
Duke Power -.471 .075 -6.31* 16 .86 2.84
Nantahala Power .
_ „
& Light -1.709 .124 -13.83* 16 .91 3.00
Yadkin -1.152 .650 -1.77* 16 .62 1.99
*U level, b5Z level, C10X level
Source: Extracted frosi complete equations containing all variables in
the model.
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two firms experienced no change and two firms experienced decreased
levels of capacity utilization. The results for the latter firmware
inconsistent with theoretical expectations.
The table also shows that the one firm from the state of Alabama
experienced no change in capacity utilization as that state changed
from fair value to original cost rate making. This is not consistent
with theory.
Table 2 also shows that five firms experienced decreased capacity
utilization as Missouri changed from original cost to fair value rate
base valuation. One firm experienced increases in capacity utilization
and one experienced no change during that same time period.
Three firms experienced decreases in capacity utilization in North
Carolina when that state changed from original cost to fair value rate
base methods and one firm experienced no change in capacity utilization
rates when this change was made.
Again, as with capital intensity, it cannot be concluded that uti-
lities follow any systematic trend to change capacity in response to a
valuation method change. While ten firms behaved here as expected,
eight others did not.
CONCLUSIONS
The capital intensity and capacity utilization variables in this
study are probably legitimate proxies for economic efficiency in terms
of resource allocation. Certainly, it seems that if managers had
adjusted those variables to take advantage of the benefits to their
firms that they would have allocated too much capital to the production
process and would have injected inefficiency into the process.
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The results show that firms did not generally behave as theory
would expect. That Is, changes in regulatory regimes did not seem to
make firms increase or decrease capital intensity so as to take advan-
tage of the benefits they could gain by that type of change. It is
true that firms may not be able to quickly change capital stock to take
advantage of differences in the regulation process. However the lag
time periods are long enough to permit adjustments to -take place in the
direction necessary to test the theory. Yet, the expected adjustments
did not actually take place.
The results, then, are quite clear. There is no reason to believe
that different rate base valuation methods induce differential ineffi-
ciency Into the economic system because of the utility's attempt to
benefit from the change in regulatory structure. This is not to say
that regulation, as an institution, does not inject inefficiency into
the system. Indeed, it may cause firms to become quite inefficient;
however, that subject is not at issue here. The research was designed
to test for relative efficiency under different regulatory regimes of
rate base valuation.
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FOOTNOTES
*We thank Robert H. Rasche for helpful comments concerning the sta-
tistical technique used in this paper.
Union Electric Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission (1978)—111
2d—381 N.E. 2d 1002; appeal: Union Electric Co. v. Illinois Commerce
Commission (1979)—111. 2d—396 N.E. 2d 510; rehearsing denied Nov. 30,
1979. A similar case was Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois
Commerce Commission (1978)—111 2d—381 N.E. 2d 999; in Allstate Insur-
ance Co. vs. Helen F. Elkins (1979)—111 2d~396 N.E. 2d 528 Justice
Ryan in his dissent referred to the 1979 case. "In that case we held
that the previous construction. . .precluded us from considering the rela-
tive merits of the 'original cost' method as against the 'fair value'
method... we need not speculate which of the two methods we would accept
'were we writing on a clean slate' ."
2
D. K. Eiteman, "Interdependence of Utility Rate Base Type, Per-
mitted Rate of Return, and Utility Earnings," Journal of Finance , March
1962, Vol. 17, pp. 38-52.
3
Robert L. Hagerman and Brian T. Ratchford, "Some Determinants of
Allowed Rates of Return on Equity to Electric Utilities," Bell Journal
of Economics , Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 1978, pp. 52-53.
4
Eiteman, Op. Cit., p. 52.
J. Pike, "Residential Electric Rates and Regulations," The
Quarterly Review of Economics and Business , Summer 1967, Vol. 7, pp.
45-52.
Walter J. Primeaux, Jr., "Rate Base Methods and Realized Rates of
Return," Economic Inquiry , Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1978, p. 95-107.
Walter J. Primeaux, Jr., Edward Bubnys and Robert H. Rasche,
"Inflation and Rate Base Valuation," Faculty Working Paper No. 793,
College of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign, August 1981, p. 32.
Yet the goal of efficiency is stated by some economists to be the
paramount economic problem. See: Richard Caves, American Industry:
Structure, Conduct, Performance (Englewood Cliffs: Second ed. , 1962),
pp. 104-105.
9
The information was obtained from U.S. Federal Power Commission,
Federal and State Commission Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric,
Gas and Telephone Utilities (Washington, D.C.: various years); Eiteman,
op. cit.; Pike, op. cit.; Phillips, op. cit.; U.S. Senate, State Utility
Commissions Summary and Tabulation of Information Submitted by the
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Commissions . Document 56, 90th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, 1967;
State of Arizona, Arizona Corporation Commission , Annual Report, June
1970.
Several cost and demand studies influenced the development of the
reduced form equation used in this study. The strongest influence was
Gregg A. Jarrell, "The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric
Utility Industry," The Journal of Law and Economics , Vol. XXI, October
1978, pp. 269-295.
An alternative means for testing for a change in the reduced form
equations coincident with the change of regulatory regimes would be the
more conventional Chow tests. In those cases where the short subsample
is less than the number of regressors this test is somewhat cumbersome,
but not difficult to apply. The shortcoming of such tests, from the
perspective of this investigation is that the test fails to reveal
whether the real rate of return (or prices) goes up or down in those
cases where the hypothesis of stability across the regimes can be re-
jected. In this sense the test is not constructive. The major caution
to note concerning the test applied here is the assumption of indepen-
dence of the forecast errors over time. If the regression residuals are
seriously autocorrelated, our estimates of the standard error of fore-
cast are biased upwards, and consequently our test would be biased in
favor of failing to reject the hypothesis of no change in structure.
However, in most of the regressions reported below there does not appear
to be a serious autocorrelation problem.
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APPENDIX
The Data and Sources
All data expressed in real terms were deflated by the implicit
price deflator. The electric utility operating data were obtained from
Statistics of Privately-Owned Electric Utilities in the United States
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Federal Power Commission, various years).
Population data were obtained from Statistical Abstract of the United
States (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, various years).
GNP data was obtained from the Economic Report of the President, 1980
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979). Value added by
Manufacturing came from two sources: Historical Statistics of the
United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1975), and Statistical Abstract of the United States .
Natural gas prices were obtained from revenue and physical sales data
found in Gas Facts (American Gas Association annual reports, various
years)
.
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